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DISABILITY LAW
INTRODUCTION
Disability laws seek to incorporate persons with disabilities in the main-
stream of American society. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA)' is the most widely-recognized and sweeping disability law promul-
gated by Congress. While it represents a common avenue for disability suits,
other interesting issues arise under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA).2 IDEA requires that states provide a "free appropriate public
education" (FAPE)3 to all children with disabilities. Part I of this Survey ad-
dresses the only IDEA case decided in the Tenth Circuit during the 1994-95
Survey period. Murray v. Montrose County School District examined IDEA's
"least restrictive environment" mandate and its effect on placing children with
disabilities in neighborhood schools.5 The Murray court concluded that, by
failing to specifically require placement in neighborhood schools, IDEA regu-
lations create a preference, rather than a presumption, that children with dis-
abilities attend either a school as close to their home as possible or the school
they would attend if not disabled.6
Part II analyzes the ADA, which expands the requirements of the Rehabil-
itation Act7 to nearly all areas of the economy. Congress intended the ADA to
not only bring persons with disabilities into the mainstream of American life,
but also "to facilitate the transition of eight million Americans with disabilities
from the ... welfare system into the labor market."8 During the survey peri-
od, the Tenth Circuit decided three significant ADA cases which clarify the re-
quirements of a prima facie ADA case.9 Basically, the Tenth Circuit requires
an individual who asserts disability based upon a substantial limitation in
working to submit evidence demonstrating disqualification from "'a class of
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1994) (formerly the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975)).
3. For a definition of free appropriate public education, see infra note 28 and accompanying
text.
4. 51 F.3d 921 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 278 (1995).
5. Murray, 51 F.3d at 928-30.
6. Id. at 929.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
8. Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an Employer's Finan-
cial Hardship Becomes "Undue" Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REv.
391, 393 (1995); Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: An Overview, 22
N.M. L. REv. 13, 46 (1992) ("The practical effect of the ADA's employment provi-
sions-assuming they are enforced adequately-could be to enable over eight million workers
with disabilities to enter the work force, thereby removing those individuals from government
subsidy rolls and empowering them to become contributing, taxpaying members of society.").
9. Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 1995); White v. York Int'l, 45 F.3d 357
(10th Cir. 1995); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1104 (1995).
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jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.""' Furthermore, the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving that reasonable and available accommodations ex-
ist, and that she is otherwise capable of performing a job to qualify for relief
under the ADA." Taken together, these opinions clarify the burden of proof
placed on plaintiffs. They also, however, erect substantial barriers to gainful
employment for persons with disabilities.
I. INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT: IDEA
A. Background
Historically, the educational system segregated children with disabilities
by excluding them from public schools and placing them in separate schools
and classrooms. Although the landmark 1954 decision of Brown v. Board of
Education3 established that all schoolchildren have a right to an equal edu-
cation despite their race, 4 the Supreme Court never interpreted Brown to en-
compass the educational rights of children with disabilities. In fact, the
Court has never found that segregating children with disabilities from other
children at school violates either equal protection or due process guarantees. 6
Nor has the Court construed the Constitution as requiring that states provide
the "least restrictive environment" when educating children with disabilities. 7
Instead, the legislature extended the equal protection and due process provi-
sions in Brown to children with disabilities via federal statutes," including
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,'9 the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975 (now part of IDEA)," and the ADA.2'
This section specifically addresses the sole Tenth Circuit decision inter-
preting IDEA during the survey period, Murray v. Montrose County School
10. See Bolton, 36 F.3d at 944 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1995)).
11. For a discussion of the requirements of the ADA, see infra notes 192-217 and accompa-
.nying text.
12. Daniel H. Melvin II, Comment, The Desegregation of Children with Disabilities, 44
DEPAuL L. REv. 599, 603-05 (1995).
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
15. Melvin, supra note 12, at 612.
16. Id.
17. Id. The term "least restrictive environment" was adopted by regulations under § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and IDEA. Compare 34 C.F.R. § 104.34 (1996) (requiring recipi-
ents of funds under § 504 to mainstream handicapped persons "to the maximum extent appropri-
ate") with 34 C.F.R. § 300.550-.556 (1995) (discussing the mainstreaming requirements mandated
by IDEA). "The term 'least restrictive environment' is often referred to as the 'mainstreaming'
mandate." Melvin, supra note 12, at 671 n.99.
18. Melvin, supra note 12, at 612.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). Section 794(a) provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States ... shall, solely
by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity... conduct-
ed by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
Id. § 794(a).
20. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (amending the Education of the Handicapped
Act, codified with subsequent amendments at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1994)).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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District.22 The Murray decision primarily addresses whether the "least restric-
tive environment" (LRE) mandate of IDEA presumes that the education of
children with disabilities take place in their neighborhood schools.23
1. The Least Restrictive Environment
IDEA applies only to children with educational disabilities,24 and in-
cludes an exhaustive list of recognized educational disabilities.25 Children
with such disabilities share a need for special education services, including
instruction specifically designed to meet their unique needs. 6 IDEA does not
require education in a regular classroom, recognizing that special education
may take place in a variety of locations, including the home, hospital, insti-
tution, or other setting.27
IDEA specifies, however, that states must provide children with disabili-
ties a "free appropriate public education" (FAPE) in the "least restrictive envi-
ronment" (LRE).2' This provision requires that state education agencies en-
sure, to the "maximum extent appropriate," that they educate disabled children
with nondisabled children. Placement in special classes or separate facilities
should occur only when the disability's severity does not permit education in
regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services.3"
Ideally, inclusion3 provides that students with disabilities, regardless of
22. 51 F.3d 921 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 278 (1995).
23. Murray, 51 F.3d at 928. The LRE mandate is required by IDEA's implementing regula-
tions. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.550-.556 (1995).
24. See, e.g., Doe v. Board of Educ., 753 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1991) (finding that a boy
with behavioral problems was not emotionally disturbed under IDEA because his difficulties did
not adversely affect his educational performance); Hiller v. Board of Educ., 743 F. Supp. 958
(N.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that a boy's learning difficulties were not educationally disabling).
25. The list includes children "with mental retardation, hearing impairments including deaf-
ness, speech or language impairments, visual impairments including blindness, serious emotional
disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or
specific learning disabilities ... who, by reason thereof, need special education and related ser-
vices." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1)(A) (1994).
26. Id. § 1401(a)(16).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 1401(a)(18). The Act defines free appropriate public education as "special educa-
tion and related services" that
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and
without charge,
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency,
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the
State involved, and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under
section [1414(a)(5)].
Id.
29. Id. § 1412(5)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b)(1) (1995); Martha M. McCarthy, Commentary,
Inclusion of Children with Disabilities: Is It Required?, 95 EDUC. L. REP. 823, 823-24 (1995).
30. 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b)(2).
31. Although the terms "inclusion" and "mainstreaming" are often used synonymously, they
are not the same. McCarthy, supra note 29, at 824. "Mainstreaming" refers to the participation of
disabled children in some activities with nondisabled children. These activities usually include
nonacademic classes such as physical education, music, assemblies, and lunch, with instructional
support. Id.; Allan G. Osborne, Commentary, The IDEA's Least Restrictive Environment Mandate:
A New Era, 88 EDUc. L. REP. 541, 542 (1994). "Inclusion," a term of art not found within the
1996]
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severity, participate in a regular classroom with children of their same age and
grade, while receiving needed educational support within that classroom.32
IDEA creates a presumption of integration,33 allowing schools to remove a
child from her regular classroom only when absolutely necessary.34
IDEA soundly supports the principle that schools educate children with
disabilities in the least restrictive environment appropriate to meet their needs,
even though the term "least restrictive environment" does not appear on the
face of the act.35 The LRE mandate acknowledges that some students need a
more restrictive environment than others, and, therefore, compliance does not
always result in "mainstreaming." 36 Regulations promulgated pursuant to
IDEA require that public agencies supply a variety of alternative placement
options that provide necessary special education and related services to chil-
dren with disabilities.37
2. The Standard for IDEA Compliance: Board of Education v. Rowley"
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled directly on the LRE doc-
trine, in Board of Education v. Rowley, the Court established both the substan-
tive standard for compliance with IDEA's FAPE requirement and the proper
scope of review for IDEA cases.39 Circuit courts continue to struggle with the
question of whether the FAPE requirement encompasses the LRE mandate, or
if the two depict separate constructs requiring different review criteria. The
tension created by this issue has resulted in a circuit split regarding the appro-
priate standard of review for IDEA cases.'
Rowley limited the standard of review to two inquiries: first, whether the
state complied with IDEA's procedures, and secondly, whether the individual-
ized educational program (IEP)4 provided reasonable educational benefits to
the child. 2 Furthermore, under Rowley, a court should determine only wheth-
er these two basic requirements are met, leaving questions of educational
text of IDEA, refers to placing students in regular classrooms with educational support. McCarthy,
supra note 29, at 824.
32. McCarthy, supra note 29, at 824.
33. Osborne, supra note 31, at 547.
34. 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b)(2).
35. The term "least restrictive environment" does appear in the regulations promulgated
under the Act. Id. §§ 300.550-.556; Melvin, supra note 12, at 621.
36. Osborne, supra note 31, at 542.
37. 34 C.F.R. § 300.551.
38. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
39. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209-10 (supporting the school district's decision not to require a
sign language interpreter because the statute requires only access to the educational process);
Melvin, supra note 12, at 626.
40. For a discussion of the position of other circuits, see infra notes 44-45, 90-98 and ac-
companying text.
41. IDEA's IEP is "a written statement that sets forth the child's present performance level,
goals and objectives, specific services that will enable the child to meet those goals and evaluation
criteria and procedures to determine whether the child has met those goals." Association for Com-
munity Living v. Romer, 992 F.2d 1040, 1043 (10th Cir. 1993); see 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20)
(1994).
42. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07.
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methodology and policy to the states."' In essence, this deferential approach
precludes courts from second-guessing the decisions of school districts.
While some circuits extend Rowley's two-part FAPE inquiry to placement
cases," other circuits decline to do so, noting that such decisions are better
left to educational professionals.45 Findings by courts that refuse to extend
Rowley recognize a distinction between decisions involving the use of a partic-
ular educational methodology and those involving a child's placement.' De-
cisions extending Rowley, by contrast, focus on the practical difficulty in dis-
tinguishing the two issues, because decisions concerning an educational
environment may affect an educational outcome. 7 If considered a question of
methodology, Rowley limits judicial review of placement decisions in LRE
cases. Unfortunately, this approach leaves placement decisions in the hands of
43. Melvin, supra note 12, at 628-29. The act leaves primary responsibility for determining
the educational method most suitable to the child's needs to the state and local educational agen-
cies. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207.
44. Melvin, supra note 12, at 629, 662-66; see Briggs v. Board of Educ., 882 F.2d 688, 691-
92 (2d Cir. 1989) (purporting to follow the test established by the Supreme Court in Rowley, but
holding that the proper test is whether placement recommended by the school district is reasonably
calculated to provide an educational benefit). While following the "reasonably calculated" test,
other circuit courts give great deference to the decisions of school districts. See, e.g., Wilson v.
Marana Unified Sch. Dist., 735 F.2d 1178, 1183 (9th Cir. 1984) (characterizing the placement
decision as one of educational policy and holding that transferring a child to a more restrictive
setting was permissible provided the transfer was reasonably calculated to provide a free appropri-
ate education).
45. See Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864
(1983) (distinguishing Rowley on the basis that the appropriateness of a disabled child's education
is different from the issue of whether the child has been placed in compliance with the LRE man-
date). Roncker adopted a feasibility test for use when a segregated facility is considered superior
to a nonsegregated facility. Id. at 1063. The test requires a court to determine if the services that
make the segregated facility superior could feasibly be provided in the nonsegregated facility. Id.
If educating the child in the nonsegregated setting is feasible, segregation is inappropriate. Id. The
Fourth and Eighth Circuits adopted the Roncker test. See Devries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882
F.2d 876, 879 (4th Cir. 1989); A.W. v. Northwest R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987).
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the Rowley test was inappropriate for LRE cases and ex-
plicitly rejected Roncker, finding it too intrusive into the educational policy decisions of local
school districts. See Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1046 (5th Cir. 1989). Dan-
iel advanced its own two-part test, first asking if education in the regular classroom with the use
of supplementary aids and services can be achieved satisfactorily. Id. at 1048. If it cannot, and the
school intends to provide special education or remove the child from the regular classroom, the
court next asks if the school has mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent appropriate. Id. at
1050. This approach has been adopted by the Third and Eleventh Circuits. Oberti v. Board of
Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir. 1993); Greer v. Rome Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 696 (11th
Cir. 1991).
The Ninth Circuit adopted yet another balancing test, this one involving four factors courts
should consider when making placement decisions. See Sacramento Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel
H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2679 (1994). The four factors include:
(1) the educational benefits available in the regular classroom as compared to the special educa-
tion classroom; (2) the non-academic benefits of interaction with children who are not disabled;
(3) the effect of the child with a disability on the teacher and other children; and (4) the cost of
mainstreaming. Id.
For an in-depth treatment of these tests, see Melvin, supra note 12, at 630-42.
46. Ralph E. Julnes, Commentary, The New Holland and Other Tests for Resolving LRE Dis-
putes, 91 EDUc. L. REP. 789, 792 (1994).
47. Id.
19961
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school officials who must consider factors extrinsic to a specific child's right
to an education in the least restrictive environment.
B. Murray v. Montrose County School District'
1. Facts
In Murray, a 12-year-old boy with multiple disabilities lived approximate-
ly five blocks from his neighborhood school.49 Pursuant to statute, 0 in April
and October of 1988, a multi-disciplinary staffing team of school district pro-
fessionals convened to formulate the requirements of Murray's special educa-
tion program." Working with input from Murray's parents, the staffing team
developed an educational plan designed to meet the child's special needs.52
At that time, the group determined that the district could meet Murray's edu-
cational goals at his neighborhood school, Olathe Elementary.53
Because Murray did not progress as expected, the staffing team reviewed
his IEP in January 1990."4 To address the district's concerns, the team modi-
fied Murray's curriculum and increased special education services.55 In July
1990, Murray underwent surgery which entailed spending six weeks in a cast.
As a result, his progress regressed in some areas, and he failed to complete his
IEP.56 At a meeting in August 1990, members of the staffing team suggested
Murray move to another school better suited to the needs of students with
multiple disabilities. 7 Because Murray's parents strongly preferred that he
remain at his local school, they failed to reach a consensus with the staffing
team about proper placement. 8 Consequently, the district's Director of Spe-
cial Education made an executive decision to move the child59 and informed
the Murrays by letter of their right to challenge the decision in a due process
hearing.' The staffing team reconvened in March 1991, but made no further
progress.6
48. 51 F.3d 921 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 278 (1995).
49. Murray's various disabilities resulted from cerebral palsy. Id. at 922. According to the
administrative law judge, his condition caused spastic quadriplegia and severe mobility and coor-
dination deficits, impaired vision due to an inability to focus his eyes together, difficulty climbing
stairs and writing, and speech impairments. Id. at 923 n.1.
50. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(18), 1414(a)(5) (1994).
51. Murray, 51 F.3d at 923.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 924.
55. Id.
56. Id. The record does not address the nature or the extent of Murray's regression.
57. Id. At the time of review, Murray was in the second grade, but functioning intellectually
at a kindergarten level in some areas and at a first grade level in others. Id. Murray's strengths
were social skills and interaction. Id.
58. Id. Staffing team members, including Olathe's psychologist, resource teacher, principal,
and Murray's classroom teacher, recommended moving Murray. Id. His parents, occupational
therapist, physical therapist, and speech therapist opposed the move. Id.
59. Id. at 924 n.6.
60. Id. at 924.
61. Id. at 925.
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At the due process hearing,62 the hearing officer determined that the
neighborhood school provided Murray with an appropriate education, and the
district appealed. 63 The administrative law judge reversed the hearing
officer's decision, finding that Murray had not achieved "any meaningful edu-
cational progress" at his neighborhood school, and holding that a transfer was
appropriate.' As provided by statute, 65 the Murrays filed a complaint in dis-
trict court.' The school district moved for summary judgment, which the
court granted and the Murrays appealed.67
Throughout the due process hearing, the litigation, and the appeals proce-
dures, Murray remained at his neighborhood school.68 The district re-evaluat-
ed his special education program in November 1993, and agreed that it could
implement his revised IEP without moving him to a different school.69
2. Decision
Noting that the Supreme Court had not addressed how lower courts should
evaluate satisfaction of the LRE mandate and acknowledging the emerging
standards adopted by other circuits, the Tenth Circuit specifically declined to
adopt a standard of review for LRE cases.7° Instead, the court determined that
a single legal issue controlled the outcome of this case: whether the LRE man-
date of section 1412(5)(b) includes a presumption favoring the neighborhood
school with its supplementary aids and services."
In a de novo hearing on the issue,72 the court of appeals held that
IDEA's LRE mandate presents no presumption of neighborhood schooling.73
The decision indicated that the plain meaning of the term "regular educational
environment" does not imply neighborhood schools.74 Furthermore, according
to the Tenth Circuit, the requirement of mainstreaming disabled children to the
maximum extent possible fails to indicate a location in which that inclusion
must take place.75 Thus, while IDEA provides that the "educational place-
ment of each child with a disability [shall be] as close as possible to the
62. Id.; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(B)(2) (1994).
63. Murray, 51 F.3d at 925.
64. Id.
65. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2).
66. Murray, 51 F.3d at 925.
67. Id. The school district originally moved for full summary judgment. Id. When the court
denied the motion, however, the district asked that the court either dismiss the complaint in part or
grant a partial summary judgment. Id.
68. Id. Murray's continued presence at the neighborhood school was part of the "stay put"
provision of IDEA, which requires that students stay where they were at the time the conflict
arose rather than being moved while litigation is in process. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3)(A).
69. Murray, 51 F.3d at 925.
70. Id. at 926-27. For a discussion of the split in the circuits, see supra notes 44-45, infra
notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
71. Murray, 51 F.3d at 928.
72. De novo hearings are held at the appellate level without relying on the decisions made at
the lower level. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 721 (6th ed. 1990).
73. Murray, 51 F.3d at 930.
74. Id. at 928.
75. Id. at 929.
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child's home,"76 such language at most denotes a preference, not a require-
ment, that education take place in a neighborhood school.77
The court, looking to the plain meaning of the statute, reasoned that while
IDEA clearly requires inclusion of children with disabilities in the regular
education process, it does not address the appropriateness of removing a child
with disabilities from a neighborhood school.7" The court specifically rejected
the Murrays' arguments that "'regular educational environment' implicitly
includes neighborhood schools, that 'special classes' means non-regular class-
es, and that 'separate schooling' means non-neighborhood schools."79
C. Analysis
The difficulty in interpreting IDEA cases stems from the somewhat con-
tradictory goals of the Act."0 IDEA requires that children with disabilities
receive different treatment via an individualized education designed to meet
their unique needs." At the same time, the Act advances a strong preference
for integration, emphasizing the commonalities disabled children share with
other children. 2
The manner in which states must implement IDEA provisions remains a
source of confusion. The LRE mandate is silent as to which schools enable a
child to receive a FAPE, and thus does not expressly require that disabled
students be placed in neighborhood schools. 3 The regulations do, however,
require placement "as close as possible to the child's home,"" and, unless
another arrangement is necessary, "in the school that he or she would attend if
nondisabled." 5 Under IDEA, the school district must provide children with
disabilities an appropriate education. A district, however, need not place these
children in neighborhood schools if it can provide a free appropriate public
education elsewhere.' To efficiently use resources, a district may exercise
discretion and concentrate services at particular schools to address students'
specific needs and disabilities.8 7
76. 34 C.F.R. § 300.552(a)(3) (1995).
77. Murray, 51 F.3d at 929.
78. The salient portion of IDEA examined by the Murray court reads:
mo the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities... are educated with
children who are not disabled, and that special classes, separate schooling, or other re-
moval of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only
when the nature or severity of the disability is such that education in regular classes with
the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily ....
20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B).
79. Murray, 51 F.3d at 928-29.
80. Melvin, supra note 12, at 643.
81. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(20), 1414(a)(5).
82. Id. § 1412(5)(B); Melvin, supra note 12, at 643.
83. Osborne, supra note 31, at 543.
84. 34 C.F.R. § 300.552(a)(3).
85. Id. § 300.552(c).
86. See Murray, 51 F.3d at 929 (holding that a district may place a student in a school other
than the neighborhood one when the student's IEP so recommends).
87. See, e.g., Barnett v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146, 151-52 (4th Cir.), cert.




The regulations, as interpreted by the Tenth Circuit's holding in Murray,
imply that districts should educate disabled students in their neighborhood
schools unless the student's IEP recommends otherwise.88 If a district can
best satisfy an IEP through placement at a location other than the
neighborhood school, proximity to a child's home becomes less important 9
even though such a decision might perpetuate segregation.
D. Other Circuits
Courts have consistently upheld school districts' practice of centralizing
special education services, thereby allowing placement of children with dis-
abilities away from neighborhood schools. 9' At least three cases addressing
the issue of placement in neighborhood schools, including Murray, support a
school district's prerogative to place children with disabilities in schools other
than those they would attend if not disabled.9'
The Fourth Circuit, in Barnett v. Fairfax County School Board, approved
a centralized cued speech program even though it required a hearing-impaired
student to attend school several miles from his home.92 The court, recogniz-
ing the limited resources available to schools and noting that the successfully
mainstreamed student participated in extracurricular activities and earned satis-
factory grades,93 acknowledged that the centralized program better served the
needs of all students.94 Likewise, the Eighth Circuit also concluded that a
school district need not modify a neighborhood school for a student using a
wheelchair because another building in the district was accessible.95
On the other hand, the Third Circuit noted in Oberti v. Board of Educa-
tion that federal regulations requiring states to place disabled children "as
close as possible to the child's home" create a presumption favoring placement
in neighborhood schools.96 Oberti, however, involved removal of a disabled
child from a regular classroom to a self-contained classroom for children with
disabilities, not removal from a neighborhood school.97 The Tenth Circuit in
Murray soundly rejected the Third Circuit's approach, noting that even Oberti
qualified the presumption by stating that placement in a neighborhood school
may not be feasible; if it is not, placement should occur as close to home as
88. Murray, 51 F.3d at 929.
89. Id.
90. Osbome, supra note 31, at 543.
91. Murray, 51 F.2d 921; Barnett, 927 F.2d 146; Schuldt v. Mankato Indep. Sch. Dist., 937
F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1059 (1992).
92. Barnett, 927 F.2d at 149.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 149-50.
95. Schuldt, 937 F.2d at 1358-59 (noting that the school district met the requirement of
providing the student with a free appropriate public education).
96. Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1224 n.31 (3d Cir. 1993). The school district
challenged a decision prohibiting it from placing a disabled child in a special education program
outside the school district. Id. at 1206-07. The court held the school district failed to meet its
burden of showing compliance with IDEA's LRE mandate. Id. at 1207.
97. Id.
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possible.98 Given these decisions, the ability of children with disabilities to
attend school in their own neighborhoods with their peers and siblings remains
fully within the discretion of school districts.
II. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: ADA
A. Background
The ADA, the most widely recognized and far-reaching antidiscrimination
statute, prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in nearly all
areas of the public and private sector." The ADA expands the scope of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973," which applied only to entities that received
federal aid. The ADA prohibits discriminatory conduct by those who do not
receive federal financial assistance as well.' Congress closely related the
two acts, as evidenced by the legislature's clear intention that the relevant case
law and regulations developed under the Rehabilitation Act generally apply to
the ADA.
°0 2
A prima facie case under the ADA requires that a plaintiff establish she:
(1) is disabled within the definition adopted by the ADA; (2) is "otherwise
qualified," meaning that she can perform the essential functions of the position
with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) was discriminated against
on the basis of her disability.' 3
The Tenth Circuit decided three employment cases brought under the
ADA during the survey period, each of which addressed issues regarding the
definition of terms and elements of proof required in ADA cases. Bolton v.
Scrivner, Inc."'4 examined the definition of an "individual with a disability"
in the "major life activity" of working, and clarified the required proof that
one is "substantially limited" in her ability to work. Likewise, White v. York
International5 and Milton v. Scrivner, Inc."°6 considered the definition of
a "qualified individual with a disability," addressed the plaintiff's burden to
provide evidence of "reasonable accommodation," and adopted a two-step
process by which courts may qualify a person under the ADA.0 Together,
these three cases refine the elements a prevailing plaintiff must demonstrate
under the ADA.
98. Murray, 51 F.3d at 929 n.13 (quoting Oberti, 995 F.3d at 1224 n.31).
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
100. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). For the statutory language of section 794(a), see supra note 19.
101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
102. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(g) (1995) (citing S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21
(1989); H.R. REP. No. 485 pt. 3, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1990)); see also School Bd. v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987) (treating Rehabilitation Act regulations promulgated by the Department
of Health and Human Services as "an important source of guidance on the meaning of § 504" of
the Rehabilitation Act) (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985)).
103. See Mason v. Frank, 32 F.3d 315, 318-19 (8th Cir. 1994); Tyndall v. National Educ.
Cirs., 31 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 1994); Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1386 (1994).
104. 36 F.3d 939 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1104 (1995).
105. 45 F.3d 357 (10th Cir. 1995).
106. 53 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 1995).
107. White, 45 F.3d at 360-63; Milton, 53 F.3d at 1123-25.
[Vol. 73:3
DISABILITY LAW
B. Individual with a Disability
The ADA covers individuals with a "a physical or mental impairment that
'substantially limits' one or more 'major life activit[ies]." ''  ° Courts analyze
three factors to determine whether an impairment substantially limits a major
life activity: "(i) the nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) the duration or
expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) the permanent or long term im-
pact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of ... the impair-
ment." 09
Although claims based on Title I of the ADA invariably involve an
employee's actual or perceived ability to work, the statutory definition of "dis-
abled" also applies to persons with impairments which restrict activity in other
areas of life."' Recognizing the inherent complexity of defining "work," the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) treats working separate-
ly from other major life activities."' EEOC regulations consider whether ma-
jor life activities other than work are substantially limited by the impairment.
Whether the impairment substantially limits working is considered only if
another area is not substantially affected." 2 Regulations note three additional
factors, which courts "may" consider when addressing whether one is substan-
tially limited in her ability to work: (1) the geographical area to which the
individual has access; (2) the class of jobs from which the individual has been
disqualified; and (3) the broad range of jobs from which the individual has
been disqualified because of her impairment."3
Courts have consistently held that the inability to perform a certain job
with a particular employer does not constitute a substantial limitation." 4
108. Under the ADA, an individual with a disability is one who has "(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B)
a record of such impairment; or (C) is regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2). Major life activities include physical tasks such as "caring for oneself, performing man-
ual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(i) (1995). The ADA does not define major life activities, but adopts the definition con-
tained in EEOC regulations. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (requiring the EEOC to issue regulations
to implement Title I of the ADA). The ADA regulations adopt the definition found in the Rehabil-
itation Act regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(ii) (1995). 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i). Major life
activities also include sitting, standing, lifting and reaching, id., as well as thinking, concentrating,
interacting with others, and reading. Michael Faillace, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act: Statutory Requirements, Legislative History, Regulations, Technical Assistance Manual, Rele-
vant Case Law under the ADA, and 1973 Rehabilitation Act, and Practical Recommendations, in
24TH ANNUAL INsTrrtJTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW, at 490 (Litig. & Admin. Prac. Course Handbook
Series No. H4-5219 1995).
109. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2).
110. Faillace, supra note 108, at 498.
111. Id.
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994) (requiring the EEOC to issue regulations to implement
Title I of the ADA).
113. The regulations provide that substantial limitation with respect to working includes sig-
nificant restriction "in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in
various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abili-
ties." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1995). In contrast, the "substantial limitation" in other life ac-
tivities involves either the inability to perform a major life activity or severe restriction on the
ability to perform a major life activity as compared to the general population. Id. § 1630.2(1)(i)-
(ii).
114. See, e.g., Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 724 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
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Furthermore, evidence of a disability requires more than an employer's mere
perception that an impairment limits an individual's ability to perform only
one job.' 5 Rather, a claimant must prove exclusion from many jobs, not just
the job the claimant had at the time of the discrimination."6
1. Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc."
7
a. Facts
Bolton suffered a work-related injury to his knee that required him to take
a leave of absence from his job as an order selector at Scrivner's grocery
warehouse.' Following his leave, the company doctor examined Bolton and
concluded that he could not perform his previous job."9 Scrivner therefore
refused to rehire Bolton as an order selector. 2 ° Bolton filed suit, alleging
discrimination on the basis of disability under the ADA, claiming substantial
limitation in the major life activity of working.'
2'
b. Decision
The district court granted Scrivner's motion for summary judgment, hold-
ing that Bolton was not an individual with a disability as defined by the
ADA.'22 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that although Bolton could not
work as an order selector, his ability to work was not substantially limited.
23
Bolton clarifies the definition of disability as it relates to the specific
major life activity of working. 24 Bolton argued that his injury significantly
115 S. Ct. 1095 (1995) (finding that an asthmatic blood bank administrator was not substantially
limited in working because, while she experienced difficulty breathing in the blood bank, her
ability to work in other areas of the hospital was not impaired); Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979
F.2d 560, 565-66 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that, under the Rehabilitation Act, a teacher who was
precluded from teaching in a school because of allergies was not handicapped solely because of
her inability to work in a particular position for a particular employer).
115. Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir. 1992).
116. Id. Relevant factors to consider include:
(A) [t]he geographical area to which the individual has access;
(B) the job from which the individual has been disqualified because of the impairment,
and the number and types of jobs using similar training, knowledge, skills, or abilities,
within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of
the impairment (class of jobs); and/or
(C) [tlhe job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment,
and the number and types of other jobs not using similar training, knowledge, skills, or
abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified
because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes).
Bolton, 36 F.3d at 943 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)).
117. 36 F.3d 939 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1104 (1995).
118. Bolton, 36 F.3d at 941.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. Bolton also claimed discrimination on the basis of age under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994). Bolton, 36 F.3d at 941. The court
held that Bolton failed to meet his burden of proof on the ADEA claim. Id. at 944.
122. Bolton, 36 F.3d at 941.
123. Id. at 941, 944.
124. Id. at 942-43. A secondary issue in Bolton concerned the application of definitions pro-
mulgated under the Rehabilitation Act to ADA cases. Id. at 942. Bolton argued that the district
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restricted him in working, as defined by Welsh v. City of Tulsa'25 and ADA
regulations. 2 6 He presented evidence of his inability to return to his position
as a grocery selector without reasonable accommodation.' 27 The Tenth Cir-
cuit applied the six factors listed in the ADA regulations which help clarify
"substantial limitation" in the context of work.'28 Although Bolton presented
evidence that addressed the severity, duration, and impact of his impairment,
he failed to establish that the impairment significantly restricted his ability to
perform either a particular class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes. 29 The court asserted that, to substantiate his claim, Bolton should
have shown evidence as to his "vocational training, the geographical area to
which he has access, [and] the number and type of jobs demanding similar
training from which Bolton" was also disqualified."3
2. Analysis: Individual with a Disability
While Bolton dealt with a claimant alleging disability only in working, the
court did not clarify whether its ruling applies to claimants who assert disabili-
ty in other major life activities. A broad reading of Bolton would encourage
courts to apply the six-factor analysis to all cases, regardless of the alleged
disability. In all likelihood, such a reading would result in fewer ADA claims
surviving summary judgment proceedings. A more narrow interpretation, con-
sistent with EEOC regulations, would require evidence of all six factors only
in cases where a plaintiff alleges disability in working.
In either case, to prevail under Bolton, a plaintiff must show more than a
mere inability to perform one job. Instead, a plaintiff must prove that the se-
verity of her impairment significantly impacts her ability to work in a class of
jobs or broad range of jobs in various classes in a particular geographical area.
court applied an improper definition of disability in granting Scrivner's motion for summary judg-
ment. Id. The court, comparing the definitions and effecting Congress's intent that Rehabilitation
Act case law be generally applied to ADA cases, found that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
define disability in substantially the same terms. Id. at 942-43. Furthermore, the court held that
these principles were consistent with the applicable ADA regulation. Id. at 943; see 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(j)(3)(i) (defining disability for the ADA). Thus, the court held the application of Rehabili-
tation Act terms and case law to ADA cases appropriate. Bolton, 36 F.3d at 943.
125. 977 F.2d 1415, 1417, 1419 (10th Cir. 1992). The Welsh court stated that "[w]hile the
[Rehabilitation Act] regulations define a major life activity to include working, this does not nec-
essarily mean working at the job of one's choice." Welsh, 977 F.2d at 1417. The Welsh court held
that "an impairment that an employer perceives as limiting an individual's ability to perform only
one job is not a handicap under the [Rehabilitation] Act." Id. at 1419.
126. Bolton, 36 F.3d at 942; supra notes 114, 117.
127. Bolton, 36 F.3d at 943-44. Bolton presented evidence including: two medical opinions
which stated that he could not return to his previous or other employment; a notice from the Okla-
homa Employment Opportunity Commission awarding unemployment benefits on the basis of
medical information regarding his limited ability to stand, walk, and lift overhead; and an opinion
from the Oklahoma Worker's Compensation Court which found he was "temporarily totally dis-
abled" and sustained a "permanent partial disability" to his left foot. Id.
128. Id. at 943 (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(2), (j)(3)(ii)); supra text accompanying notes
108, 114.
129. Bolton, 36 F.3d at 944 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i)).
130. Id. Contra Delida Costin, Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939 (10th Cir. 1994), 4 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 488, 491 (1995) (concluding that the Bolton decision does not explain what evi-
dence would have sufficiently met the required factors).
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Although the Tenth Circuit held that the evidence presented by Bolton failed
to meet this standard, 3' it did not give specific guidance regarding what type
of evidence might be dispositive. Rather, the court implied that additional
information relating specifically to training and other vocational factors, in-
cluding the number and types of jobs for which an impairment disqualifies a
plaintiff, may help establish the element of substantial limitation in work-
ing.
132
The court implied that Bolton should have presented evidence of his ex-
clusion from a class of jobs or broad range of jobs in various classes in his
geographical area in order to avoid dismissal via summary judgment. An ex-
pert in vocational rehabilitation may be required to provide this information on
behalf of ADA plaintiffs in similar cases.133
3. Other Circuits
Other circuits that use the six-factor analysis have consistently held that a
claimant must demonstrate an inability to perform a variety of jobs to make a
prima facie case.'34 For example, the Second Circuit held that an individual
deemed unfit for the position of police officer due to the individual's poor
judgment, irresponsible behavior, and poor impulse control was not substan-
tially limited in working. 35 Likewise, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a decision
holding that a person with a knee problem who could not perform jobs requir-
ing him to climb a telephone pole, but who could perform other activities, was
not substantially limited in working and was therefore not handicapped under
the Rehabilitation Act.'36 While the Tenth Circuit in Welsh held that working
at the job of one's choice is not a major life activity, 37 the Sixth Circuit has
held that substantial limitation in working does not require complete inability
to work.'38
C. Qualified Individual with a Disability
Like its precursor, the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA provides protection for
"otherwise qualified" individuals with disabilities. 39 The Supreme Court, in
131. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text (discussing Bolton's failure to survive
Scrivner's motion for summary judgment).
132. Bolton, 36 F.3d at 944.
133. See id. (describing the types of evidence Bolton might have produced).
134. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
135. Daly v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1989).
136. Elstner v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 659 F. Supp. 1328, 1343 (S.D. Tex. 1987), aff d,
863 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1988) (unpublished opinion).
137. Welsh, 977 F.2d at 1417 (holding that a firefighter with decreased sensation in two fin-
gers was not substantially limited in major life activities and therefore not "handicapped" under
the law).
138. Everette v. Runyon, 911 F. Supp. 180, 183 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (noting that a person com-
pletely unable to work, and therefore not "otherwise qualified," cannot claim discrimination based
on a disability).
139. Compare "No otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason
of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance .... " 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (the Rehabilitation Act) with 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (the ADA)
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one of the first Rehabilitation Act cases, Southeastern Community College v.
Davis," narrowly interpreted the qualification requirement, finding that an
otherwise qualified individual must meet all of a program's requirements de-
spite her handicap. 4' This decision required that claimants demonstrate an
ability to participate fully despite their disability before becoming entitled to
an accommodation.'42 Paradoxically, such a showing negates the need for an
accommodation.'43 This view gradually changed as the Court considered
whether reasonable accommodations would help make a disabled person other-
wise qualified.'" The Court's basic struggle, which continues today, is to
determine which comes first, consideration of accommodation or the determi-
nation of qualification.
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline 5 expanded the definition of a
qualified individual to include consideration of an individual's ability to per-
form essential job functions.'" This change led to the current requirement
that a claimant establish herself as a qualified individual by presenting evi-
dence of her ability to perform the essential functions in question.'47 So,
while the ADA defines "qualified individual with a disability" separately from
"essential functions" and "reasonable accommodations," in practice the two
prongs form a single inquiry."
Arline recognized a two-part analysis for determining qualification in
Rehabilitation Act cases. 49 The first inquiry advanced in Arline, and later
adopted by the ADA, asks whether an individual can perform the essential
functions of her job. 5° If the individual cannot perform the essential
functions solely because of her disability, 5' a court advances to the second
inquiry, whether reasonable accommodations would enable her to do so.'52
(stating that an otherwise qualified individual with a disability can perform the essential functions
of a job with or without reasonable accommodation).
140. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
141. Davis, 442 U.S. at 406 (holding that a nursing program need not make accommodations
which would fundamentally alter the nature of the program). Disability rights advocates and com-
mentators widely criticized the Davis decision. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 8, at 411-12.
142. Sarah 0. Sparboe, Comment, Must Bar Examiners Accommodate the Disabled in the Ad-
ministration of Bar Exams?, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391, 394 (1995).
143. Id.
144. Id. Courts can no longer literally apply the Davis standard that an otherwise qualified
individual is one who can satisfy the job requirements in spite of a disability, but must now con-
tend with the "rather mushy" question of "whether a reasonable accommodation could satisfy the
interests of the employer and individual with a disability." Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248,
1261-62 (5th Cir. 1988); Eric W. Richardson, Who Is a Qualified Individual Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 189, 205 (1995).
145. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
146. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288; Richardson, supra note 144, at 204-05.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1995).
148. Richardson, supra note 144, at 191 n.18.
149. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-88.
150. White, 45 F.3d at 361-62. The ADA does not require an employer to fundamentally alter
the nature of the job. Id.
151. In summary judgment proceedings, a plaintiff must establish that the answer to the first
inquiry creates a material question of fact.
152. White, 45 F.3d at 361-62.
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A court must identify the essential functions of a job before comparing an
individual's qualifications for a particular job with the job's requirements."'
In making this determination, the ADA requires the court to consider the
employer's judgment, written job descriptions, and whether employees in the
position actually perform the identified functions. 54
Generally, courts defer to an employer's assessment of essential functions
even though the ADA does not consider such evidence conclusive.'55 The
need to distinguish between the type, amount, and manner in which work is
done exemplifies the complexity of the ADA. Since an employer possesses
greater expertise in determining the skills necessary to successfully complete a
particular job, a court will not usually second-guess production standards that
establish quality or quantity of work.'56 Clearly, ADA regulations do not
require employers to lower production standards in order to accommodate
persons with disabilities.'57
Unlike the deferential treatment accorded employers in the determination
of the essential functions of a job, Congress did not intend for courts to defer
to an employer's judgment regarding the manner in which employees accom-
plish their work. Few employers possess the skill necessary to identify alterna-
tive ways of completing tasks.'58 Despite this, the ADA permits an employer
to re-evaluate and restructure jobs and to add or change tasks at its discre-
tion,'59 even though such changes may result in workers with disabilities
153. Essential functions include tasks that are more than marginal to the job. 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(n)(1). "Marginal functions," while not defined by EEOC regulations, include job duties
that are neither fundamental nor essential to the position. See id. For example, a company's chief
executive officer (CEO) is typically presumed to be able to drive to work or business meetings;
however, driving is not considered an essential function of a CEO's position. Richardson, supra
note 144, at 192 n.30.
154. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).
155. Lucinda A. Castellano, Surviving Summary Judgment in the ADA Employment
Case-Part 11, 24 CoLo. LAW. 1785, 1785 (1995); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i); see also
Ackerman v. Western Elec. Co., 860 F.2d 1514, 1519 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that, although cer-
tain types of heavy work were an essential function of the plaintiff's job group, those functions
were nonessential to any particular individual's performance of one job); Henchey v. Town of N.
Greenbush, 831 F. Supp. 960, 966 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that where discrepancies exist be-
tween the job description and actual job duties, the job description is not conclusive).
156. Milton, 53 F.3d at 1123; Castellano, supra note 155, at 1785; see also D. Todd Arney,
Survey of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title 1: With the Final Regulations In, Are the Criti-
cisms Out?, 31 WASHBURN L.J. 522, 535 (1992) (discussing lingering problems with the ADA).
157. Milton, 53 F.3d at 1124.
158. Castellano is careful to note that:
[iun its deliberations on the ADA, Congress defeated an amendment that would have cre-
ated a presumption in favor of the employer's judgment regarding essential functions of
the job. Such deference to the employer's judgment was rejected because of the belief
that although employers are used to certain ways of performing job functions, they may
not have considered other ways a result might be accomplished.
Castellano, supra note 155, at 1785 n.15 (citing H.R. JuD. REP., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 136, re-
printed in The Legislative History of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 1990, LRP Pub. at 584
(1990)).
159. The ADA does not specifically state that an employer may change job functions at its
discretion. The courts, however, rely heavily on an employer's judgment in determining what
functions are essential and generally will not second guess the employer's statements. See, e.g.,
John A. Conway, Comment, The Americans with Disabilities Act: New Challenges in Airline Hir-
ing Practices, 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 945, 963 (1994) ("Because courts are required to defer to
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being unable to perform the revised job with its new tasks.
Once a court establishes the tasks essential to a job's function, it must
determine if the plaintiff can perform those tasks without reasonable accom-
modations. If she cannot, the court must consider the availability of reasonable
accommodations including modification of existing facilities, work schedules,
equipment, job restructuring, or any other change that would allow a disabled
employee to perform a job's essential tasks."6 The ADA compels only
accommodations that will enable a disabled employee to perform the essential
functions of a job' and not those that will impose an "undue hardship" on
the business.'62
A plaintiff must produce evidence at trial sufficient to make an initial
showing regarding the availability of accommodations.'63 Once a plaintiff
makes this showing, the burden shifts to the defendant, who must present
evidence of its inability to accommodate." This burden, if met by the de-
fendant, then shifts back to the plaintiff, who must rebut the defendant's con-
tention with suggestions for possible accommodations.'65 The courts give lit-
tle guidance, however, to the type of evidence a plaintiff must present to meet
her burden.
1. White v. York International"6
a. Facts
York initially hired White as a unit assembler and, seven years later,
transferred him to the position of machine operator.'67 Both jobs required
employers' job requirements if the description represents an accurate portrayal of the essential
functions, the ADA encourages employers to develop written descriptions."). But see Sue A.
Krenek, Note, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1969, 1981 (1994) ("Al-
though courts have tried to defer to an employer's decision about what constitutes the essential
functions of a job, the employer's determination has not always been accepted uncritically.")
(footnotes omitted).
160. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o)(2)-(3).
161. This limitation does not appear in the ADA but has been the subject of cases brought
under the Rehabilitation Act. See, e.g., Arline, 480 U.S. at 288; Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d
473, 477-78 (11th Cir. 1983); Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 307 (5th Cir.
1981).
162. The ADA defines undue hardship as "significant difficulty or expense." 42 U.S.C. §
1211 1(10)(A). The following six factors may be used to determine if a particular reasonable ac-
commodation may be refused because it causes undue hardship: (1) the nature and cost of the
accommodation; (2) the overall financial resources of the facility; (3) the overall financial resourc-
es of the covered entity; (4) the type of operation(s) of the covered entity; (5) the impact of the
accommodation upon the operation of the facility; and (6) the number of employees or applicants
the accommodation will potentially benefit. R. Bales, Libertarianism, Environmentalism and Utili-
tarianism: An Examination of Theoretical Frameworks for Enforcing Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 1993 DET. C.L. REV. 1163, 1181-84. The first four factors are listed in the ADA
itself; the EEOC regulations add the fifth factor; and the final factor is suggested by the ADA's
legislative history. Id.
163. White, 45 F.3d at 361.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 308).
166. 45 F.3d 357 (10th Cir. 1995).
167. White, 45 F.3d at 358-59.
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lifting and continuous standing."6 Following his transfer to the machine op-
erator position, White sustained a non-work-related injury to his right an-
kle. 69 He underwent an ankle fusion, which resulted in a twelve-month
medical leave of absence.' White's physician released him to return to
work with restrictions including "work as tolerated, no standing for longer
than four hours, and no lifting more than fifteen pounds."'
7
1
York requested an independent medical evaluation, which determined that
White could not return to work due to incomplete fusion of his ankle."1
2
Shortly thereafter, York terminated White by letter, citing White's year-long
absence, and further stating that the company was unaware of any accommo-
dations it could reasonably make that would allow White to perform his job in
light of his medical limitations."3
White sued York both on the basis of discrimination under the ADA and
an Oklahoma antidiscrimination law.'74 The district court granted York's mo-
tion for summary judgment, finding that even if White met the definition of an
individual with a disability (a factual issue not determined by the court), no
evidence supported the allegation that he could perform the essential functions
of his position with reasonable accommodations."5 Thus, White failed to es-
tablish that he was a qualified individual with a disability." 6
b. Decision
In a de novo hearing on the issue, the Tenth Circuit adopted the two-part
analysis articulated by the Supreme Court in Arline to determine qualification
under the ADA.177 After determining that White could not perform his job's
essential functions, the court turned to the issue of reasonable accommoda-
tions."7 The court concluded that White failed to carry his burden of proof
by not providing information regarding the availability of specific accommoda-
tions which would allow him to continue his employment with York.' 79
2. Milton v. Scrivner, Inc.'80
a. Facts
Scrivner employed both plaintiffs as grocery selectors.'' Both received








176. Id. at 359-60.
177. Id. at 361-62.
178. Id. at 362.
179. Id.
180. 53 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 1995).
181. Milton, 53 F.3d at 1120.
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injuries during the course of their job duties.' Following the plaintiffs' inju-
ries, Scrivner increased the productivity level required of employees. 3
When the plaintiffs could not meet the new production standards, Scrivner
discharged them, and they sued under state and federal antidiscrimination
laws." 4
Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Scrivner discriminated against
them in violation of the ADA, an Oklahoma statute prohibiting wrongful ter-
mination, provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the union
and Scrivner, and other assorted state and federal statutes prohibiting unlawful
discrimination."5 Ultimately, resolution of all claims hinged on a determina-
tion of the alleged disability discrimination.8 6 The district court concluded
that the state law claims were preempted and that the plaintiffs were not eligi-
ble for relief under the ADA.
8 7
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment order
based upon the claimants' failure to establish their status as otherwise quali-
fied individuals with disabilities. 8 In its decision, the court applied the
Arline analysis for determining qualification under ADA. 89 As described in
White, the burden rested with the employees to show the availability of
reasonable accommodations."9 Because the plaintiffs provided no evidence
that reasonable accommodation was possible, the court upheld the defendant's
motion for summary judgment. 9 '
3. Analysis: Qualified Individual with a Disability
Because the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the definition of a qualified
individual with a disability embodies the concepts of essential functions and
reasonable accommodations,'92 a plaintiff seeking to establish that she is
qualified under the ADA bears a tremendous burden. First, she must show that
she can perform the essential job functions with or without
accommodation.' If she requires accommodation, she must then demon-
strate that specific, available accommodations exist.' Finally, she must







188. Id. at 1121.
189. Id. at 1123.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1124.
192. Id. at 1123.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1124-25.
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In light of White and Milton, it appears that the court will accept an
employer's description of essential tasks unless a plaintiff proves that the tasks
are unrelated to a business necessity. 96 Therefore, a claimant who disagrees
with an employer's assertion of essential functions must, at a minimum,
present specific evidence rebutting the essential nature of the tasks.'97 At its
discretion, however, an employer can establish or change the content, nature,
or functions of a job, as seen in Milton.' There, the court found that the
employer's decision to change its business to increase profits was permissible
under the ADA, even though the court never determined the essential func-
tions of the job in question.'
EEOC guidelines apparently require that an employer initiate an informal
process to identify specific accommodations once it becomes aware of the
need.2" The White court, however, interpreted the regulations as triggering
the interactive process only if an employee is otherwise qualified."' There-
fore, an employer must make a threshold determination regarding qualification
before engaging in a dialogue regarding accommodation,2 2 much like the
controversial Supreme Court decision in Davis."3
In the Tenth Circuit, before an employer need consider making accommo-
dations, an employee must first establish the availability of specific accommo-
dations.2" Although the court clearly places the burden on a plaintiff to
show that reasonable accommodations exist, it fails to clarify the specific type
of evidence required for such a showing.2 5 For example, although White
maintained that York could modify White's former job or reassign him to
another position, the court flatly rejected these suggestions as insuffi-
cient--even though EEOC regulations identify both as potential accommo-
dations.2 7
196. White, 45 F.3d at 362; Milton, 53 F.3d at 1124.
197. Milton, 53 F.3d at 1124.
198. Id.
199. Id. Likewise, the defendants in White contended that the job required the ability to lift
more than fifteen pounds and stand more than four hours at time. White, 45 F.3d at 362. The
plaintiff presented no evidence to the contrary, and did not contest the employer's assertion that it
could not eliminate the job requirements without fundamentally changing the nature of the job. Id.
Because no rebuttal evidence was presented, the court accepted the employer's description of
lifting and standing requirements as essential. Id.
200. White, 45 F.3d at 363.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
204. White, 45 F.3d at 360-61.
205. Milton, 53 F.3d at 1124. The Tenth Circuit declined to address whether the unsupported
personal conclusions regarding accommodations are sufficient to make a facial showing. Id.
206. White, 45 F.3d at 362; see also Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1395 (5th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1386 (1994) (finding that diabetic plaintiffs who required an ac-
commodation because they posed a substantial risk without the accommodation, were not "other-
wise qualified"); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1126-27 (11 th Cir. 1993) (holding
that firefighters' suggested elimination of the "no beard" rule was an unreasonable accommoda-
tion). But see Wood v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 437, 438-39 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that dia-
betic plaintiffs met their burden of asserting reasonable accommodation by proposing they conduct
self-administered blood tests and carry snacks).
207. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o). Clearly, accommodation through job restructuring does not
require an employer to reallocate essential job functions, because such functions are the very ones
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The Milton decision goes even further, placing a greater burden on a
plaintiff to also show that the suggested accommodations are reasonable.'a
For instance, the court found the plaintiffs' suggestions, which included lower
required production, a lessened workload, or possible transfer within the com-
pany, unreasonable." Though the court specifically held that the alteration
or reduction of the workload was unreasonable for the defendant in Milton, it
further suggested that reallocation of job duties or reassignment are per se
unreasonable."°
These Tenth Circuit decisions, in practical terms, grant employers com-
plete discretion to determine the availability of an accommodation and, in the
opinion of at least one commentator, "return the system to pre-ADA days
when an employer's fair, biased, or simply uninformed judgment on accom-
modation was the final word." '' Based upon the uniqueness of disability
claims,2 2  and the requirement that employers provide reasonable
accommodation, some argue that courts should place higher burdens on em-
ployers.2 3 This approach would ensure that, when making qualification de-
terminations, employers fully consider a disabled individual's abilities, rather
than her limitations.2 4 Since many employees with disabilities lack knowl-
edge of how they could accomplish their job performance through alternative
means, 215 placing the burden on them effectively serves to defeat a claim at
its onset."' By failing to require that employers prove a plaintiff unqualified,
or that reasonable accommodations would cause undue hardship, the Tenth
Circuit prevents persons with disabilities from reaching their full potential in
the workforce.2 7
that the individual holding the job would have to perform with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion. See Buko v. American Medical Lab. Co., 830 F. Supp. 899, 905 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff d, 28
F.3d 1208 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion). Generally, existing employees may be accom-
modated by transfer or reassignment; however, an employer should consider reassignment only
when accommodation of the current position poses an undue hardship. Reassignment need not be
limited to a position of the same grade as the employee's current position, but may be to a lower
position if no equivalent job is available. Id. § 1630.2(o). Reassignment to an equivalent position
in terms of pay, status, responsibility, and other conditions of employment represents reasonable
accommodation. Id.
208. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o); Milton, 53 F.3d at 1124.
209. Milton, 53 F.3d at 1124.
210. Id. "An employer is not required by the ADA to reallocate job duties [or] change the
essential functions of a job." Id.; 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o).
211. Castellano, supra note 155, at 1786.
212. Lianne C. Knych, Note, Assessing the Application of McDonnell Douglas to Employment
Discrimination Claims Brought Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 79 MINN. L. REv.
1515, 1535-36 (1995). Unlike other forms of employment discrimination, i.e. race and gender,
which are not based on a rational relationship between the discrimination and the ability to per-
form the job, the ADA recognizes that disability may actually affect job performance. Id.
213. Id. at 1546.
214. Id. at 1545 n.157.
215. Castellano, supra note 155, at 1786.
216. See Knych, supra note 212, at 1538. "[Al disabled plaintiff faces a virtually insurmount-
able barrier under the McDonnell Douglas test because its allocation of the burden of proof is too
rigid." Id.
217. Id. at 1546.
1996]
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4. Other Circuits
Because the Supreme Court has offered little guidance, circuit courts
inconsistently allocate the burden of proof in employment discrimination cases
brought under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.2 8 Regulations im-
ply that employers should be responsible for initiating inquiries into availabili-
ty of reasonable accommodations,"!9 yet courts do not universally require
employers to carry this burden.22° For example, the Ninth Circuit places the
initial burden of raising the accommodation issue on the employer, characteriz-
ing the plaintiff's burden as one of coming forward to rebut an employer's
showing that no reasonable accommodation is available."'
The Second Circuit in Gilbert v. Frank,"22 however, found that since the
term "otherwise qualified" by definition includes the concept of reasonable
accommodation, a plaintiff's prima facie burden includes showing that she can
perform the job's essential functions in spite of her handicap, with or without
accommodation.223 The Gilbert court indicated that the burden was not
heavy, as it only requires that a plaintiff produce evidence regarding her
capabilities as well as some suggestions for reasonable modification from the
employer.224 Once a plaintiff meets this initial showing, her employer must
prove the accommodation impossible.225 The Gilbert court, acknowledging
the goals of the Rehabilitation Act and the greater access to information
regarding the feasibility of various modifications, ultimately allocated the
burden of proof to the employer on the issue of reasonable accommoda-
tion.226
CONCLUSION
Some believe that courts in future ADA cases will adopt the view of the
Illinois court that decided the first ADA case.227 The Illinois District Court in
EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigation Ltd.2"' indicated only marginal concern
about how an employee performs a job, but placed primary emphasis on the
completion of the job tasks.229 Should courts adopt such an approach,
218. Id. at 1541.
219. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9. EEOC guidelines contemplate that an employer will determine
the essential functions of a job, consult with the individual to identify potential barriers and ac-
commodations, and, considering the individual's preference, select the best accommodation. In
cases in which the accommodation is not obvious, the employer should consider a defined deci-
sion-making process. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1603.9; Castellano, supra note 155, at 1786.
220. To prevail, an employee must show that the handicap can be accommodated or that the
employer denied employment based on reasons not related to the job. Richardson, supra note 144,
at 198-99.
221. See Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1424 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that the "burden
of persuasion in proving the inability to accommodate always remains on the employer").
222. 949 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1991).
223. Gilbert, 949 F.2d at 642.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Castellano, supra note 155, at 1786.
227. EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigation, Ltd., 820 F. Supp 1060 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Louis
Pechman, Coping with Mental Disabilities in the Workplace, 67 N.Y. ST. B.J. 22, 24 (1995).
228. 820 F. Supp. 1060 (N.D. I11. 1993).
229. AIC, 820 F. Supp. at 1064; cf. Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538,
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employment opportunities for individuals with disabilities will substantially in-
crease.
Disability laws, purporting to address the issue of segregation of persons
with disabilities, strive to provide opportunities for those individuals to fully
participate in the mainstream of the American economy. Yet, on the whole,
these laws have done little to encourage integration. Ostensibly, the least re-
strictive environment requirement of IDEA means that schools should educate
children with disabilities with their nondisabled peers. Yet, across the country,
school districts continue to exclude students with disabilities from the regular
classroom and segregate them from their peers, siblings, and neighbor-
hoods.23 Like prior cases in other circuits, Murray continues the tradition of
segregation by placing greater emphasis on the rights of school districts rather
than on the rights of children.
Likewise, Congress took strong action toward eliminating segregation by
passing the ADA and adopting as its statutory purpose a "clear" mandate to
end all forms of segregation in employment, access to governmental services,
communications, and public accommodations."' Unfortunately, recent deci-
sions in the Tenth Circuit erect barriers which make implementation of this
promise difficult, if not impossible to achieve.
Stephanie Jae Stevenson
545 (7th Cir. 1995) ("An employer is not required to allow disabled workers to work at home,
where their productivity inevitably would be greatly reduced.").
230. Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64
TEMP. L. REV. 393, 394 (1991).
231. Id. at 398; see 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l)-(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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